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1 Writing in 1954—a decade before the conservatives’ ascendancy within the Republican
Party and nearly a generation before conservatism would complete its transformation
from an elitist ideology to a mass political movement—C. Wright Mills reflected upon
what he understood as the absence of the social and historical conditions necessary for
the development of an authentic American conservatism. His skepticism is worth quoting
at  some  length:  “A  noble  aristocracy,  a  peasantry,  a  petty-bourgeoisie  with  guild
inheritance—that is what is needed for a conservative ideology…in America, liberalism—
and  the  middle  classes  that  bore  it  as  a  deep-seated  style  of  thought—has  been  so
paramount as to preclude any flowering of genuinely conservative ideology. Here, from
their beginnings, the middle classes have been predominant—in class and in status and in
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power. There is one consequence of this simple fact that goes far to explain why there can
be no genuinely conservative ideology in the United States: There is s?mply no stratum or
group  in  the  population  that  is  of  any  political  consequence  to  whose  traditions
conservatism could appeal.”1
2 Mills’ conclusions about the dismal future of American conservatism may have fit the
times in which he was writing, although the “consensus era” would prove to be short-
lived (if it ever actually existed at all) in light of the increasing relative strength and
growing  unification  of  libertarianism,  anticommunism  and  traditionalism  (or  social
conservatism), the three forms of postwar conservatism outlined by George Nash in his
1976 masterwork,  The  Conservative  Intellectual  Movement  in  America  since  1945.  As  Nash
argues,  “No rigid barriers separated the three groups.  Traditionalists and libertarians
were  usually  anti-Communists…Nevertheless,  the  impulses  that  comprised  the
developing  conservative  movement  were  clearly  diverse.”2 The  rising  tide  of
conservatism that would come to characterize American politics and society during the
long  post-WWII  era  would  have  much  to  do  with  the  backlash  against  the  social
movements of the 1960s and 70s (civil rights, gay rights, feminism and peace) and with
the economic and ideological changes wrought by the emergent neoliberal era.  Aside
from the civil rights issue—which he apparently found neither intellectually stimulating
nor politically promising3—Mills would not live to see these developments, although he
too may have been puzzled by them, particularly by the rising appeal of free market
libertarianism among working class Americans.
3 In my survey course on American history, a recent lecture on the topic of Reaganism also
baffled a German Erasmus student: how, he asked, is it possible that an anti-state ideology
could appeal to the working classes, particularly in light of the history of the New Deal?
In attempting to answer his astute question, I tried to explain that the story of postwar
conservatism is at once simple (racism, homophobia, religious fundamentalism, etc.) and
complex, and that its more complicated dynamics are often of the economic kind: why,
indeed, do specific economic policies and a more general economic ideology that would
clearly function to the benefit of the upper classes, find such support among ordinary
Americans? These sorts of questions have been at the heart of the writing of Thomas
Frank, who memorably characterized his own political outlook as a farcical inversion of
Marx’s model of social relations in capitalist society. “Businessmen were the working
class, I reasoned, because they worked for a living. They were the producers. They paid
taxes; they built the buildings; they bought the cars…government on the other hand,
lived by imposing taxation. It produced nothing; it interfered with real people’s business
and then arrogantly handed out their hard-earned money to a population of parasites.
This, then, was the conflict: Workers versus government.”4 
4 Frank describes, rather than explains, the prevalence of economic conservatism in the
contemporary United States. Indeed, the scholarship on postwar conservatism has tended
to focus upon the changes taking place in the attitudes of the American public in the
realms  of  culture  and  politics,  rather  than  the  economy.  Traditionalism  (whether
operating through racism, religious fundamentalism, “family values” or other cultural
forms)  is  arguably more straightforward and easier  to  come to  terms with than the
counterintuitive  and  apparently  “irrational”  mysteries  of  economic  conservatism,
through which American voters have increasingly sided with the anti-tax, deregulatory
and free market interests of the nation’s largest and most powerful corporations. To be
sure, the libertarianism that continues to have such a firm hold on the consciousness of
Anthony DiMaggio, The Rise of the Tea Party: Political Discontent and Corpora...
European journal of American studies , Reviews 2013-1 | 2013
2
many  Americans  continues  to  overlap  with  “cultural”  elements,  but  it  would  be
wrongheaded to reduce economic conservatism, in all instances, to a simple expression of
white racism.
5 The 1978 “property tax revolt” in California remains an important moment in the recent
history  of  economic  conservatism.  During  the  1970s,  California  housing  prices  were
skyrocketing largely because of immigration and inflation. So too were property taxes,
which were pegged to the increasing value of California homes. Many Californians faced
massive  tax  increases  after  their  homes’  values  were  reassessed  by  the  state.  This
situation led to an aligning of the public mood and the life’s work of Howard Jarvis, a
southern California industrialist,  who devoted much of his life to opposing state and
federal  taxes.  Jarvis  had  created  the  United  Organizations  of  Taxpayers  (UOT),  an
organization that unsuccessfully attempted to introduce tax limitation measures in 1968,
1971  and  1976,  having  failed  on  all  three  occasions  to  gather  enough  signatures  (a
requirement of California’s unique ballot initiative process).  Beginning in 1977,  Jarvis
began to link the UOT to other organizations, such as the Los Angeles Apartment Owners
Association,  various  chambers  of  commerce,  and  the  People’s  Advocate,  which  was
founded  by  Jarvis’  eventual  anti-tax  partner,  Paul  Gann.  Together,  Jarvis  and  Gann
authored  another  attempt  to  change  the  California  constitution  to  place  severe
restrictions  on  property  taxes.  The  resultant  “People's  Initiative  to  Limit  Property
Taxation,” otherwise known as the Jarvis-Gann Initiative, restricted property taxes to
only 1% of the value of a home. The initiative, California’s Proposition 13, passed on June
6, 1978, by a lopsided two-to-one margin. The victory for Jarvis and Gann resulted in an
immediate 60% across-the-board slashing of property taxes,  effectively erasing the $6
billion California surplus and setting the stage for massive budget cuts and crises in
subsequent  years.  In  a  televised  press  conference  in  the  aftermath  of  his  stunning
breakthrough, Jarvis declared, “We have a new revolution against the arrogant politicians
and insensitive bureaucrats whose philosophy of tax, tax, tax, spend, spend, spend, and
elect, and elect, and elect, is bankrupting, we, the American people! The time has come to
put a stop to it!...The taxpayers have spoken. We have made clear our goals. Now we are
watching you. It is your responsibility to [cut] the barrels of lard out of the government
budget!” One of Jarvis’ supporters proclaimed, “It’s kind of like a Boston Tea Party!”5
6 A common interpretation of the California tax revolt is that it represented a “grassroots”
expression of economic conservatism and the increasing appeal of libertarianism among
the American public. However, Daniel A. Smith has argued that it was merely an instance
of faux populism, “a populist-sounding message without the political mobilization of ‘the
people.’… Absent from faux populist movements is the active laboring and protest of the
masses.”  He  continues,  “While  steeped  in  populist  rhetoric, Prop  13  was  centrally
orchestrated, as Jarvis relied on large property interests for much of his financial and
especially his organizational backing.”6 Smith’s unwillingness to treat the “tax revolt” as
an  authentic  expression  of  grassroots  conservatism  is  indicative  of  the  persistent
disagreement among authors who are attempting to come to terms with another and
more recent high profile manifestation of American conservatism: the so-called tea party
movement. While some characterize it as a genuine populist movement that has sprung
from the grassroots of American society, others view it as being led (if not created by) the
right wing political / corporate establishment.7
7 Among those in the latter camp is Anthony DiMaggio, author of The Rise of the Tea Party:
Political Discontent in the Age of Obama.8 DiMaggio’s book advances several important points
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about the tea party,  although his  insights  are generally overshadowed by the book’s
stylistic and substantive deficiencies. Its cover image, an up-side-down depiction of three
tea  party  activists  (two  of  whom are  donning  colonial-era  costumes)  is  provocative,
although the surprisingly dry language of the text tends to reduce the polarizing nature
of the movement to a matter of hypothesis testing, to the validation of predictive models
and to  reporting  on  the  subsequent  “findings”  that  are  akin  to  scientific  discovery.
“Materialist  filters  are  those  that  relate  to  the  tangible  lifetime  advantages…These
variables [sex, race, income, education, political efficacy, class and race-based religious
fundamentalism]  are  expected  to  play  a  role  in  the  public’s  formation  of  political
attitudes. All of these variables are statistically differentiated…[and] are characterized by
a marked differentiation in affluence, with the former of each pair being more affluent in
that  they  earn  high  incomes,  and  the  latter  being  less  affluent  and  earning  lower
incomes” (20). The book occasionally gives up on the use of paragraphs, reverting to a
series of bullet points to advance its arguments or to tidily present “findings.”
8 Beyond the stylistic shortcomings, DiMaggio’s book is situated within the field of media
studies, and one of its principal aims is to show how the “propaganda model” (developed
by  Edward  Herman  and  Noam  Chomsky,  in  which  they  show  how  state-sanctioned
discourse and ideology is legitimized and adopted by the public through a subservient
mass media)  is  a  useful  device for understanding the tea party.9 One of  the primary
arguments of DiMaggio’s book is that the mass media, particularly Fox News—but also
“liberal” outlets including the New York Times and the major television networks—have
essentially propagated the continuation of the tea party by either collaborating in the
creation of their talking points (as was the case with Fox) or by uncritically repeating
their rhetoric (as was the case with several columnists of the New York Times). Together,
the media have not only perpetuated the appearance of a viable grassroots phenomenon,
they have shaped public opinion, particularly in relation to the Obama health care
overhaul. “The media played the defining role in influencing what Americans saw and did
not  see  regarding  healthcare  reform.  Surveys  from  2009  and  2010  found  a  strong
correlation between media attention to healthcare and public interest in the issue.”10 In
other words, “Simply by dominating the issues and how they were discussed, Republicans
and Tea Parties influenced policy preferences through the media. By transforming the
healthcare debate into a discussion of ‘death panels,’ ‘rationing,’ government ‘socialism,’
and ‘cost,’ Tea Partiers and other Republican officials were able to direct public attention
to the perceived drawbacks of reform” (200). 
9 A second central task of DiMaggio’s work is to show how the tea party is not an “outside”
or “independent” political force. Rather, its leaders and goals are squarely part of the
right wing political and corporate establishment. DiMaggio cites surveys conducted by
Quinnipiac and Pew Research Center, which show the high correlation between those
who participate in tea party activities and identification with the Republican Party. “In
short, public claims from conservative and mainstream pundits that the Tea Party is not
fundamentally a Republican operation are unwarranted and contradicted by the available
evidence”  (94).  DiMaggio  also  uses  his  own  observations  of  tea  party  meetings  and
marches he attended in the Chicago area shortly before the 2010 midterm elections,
which were devoted to promoting Republican candidates. “By the end of the march, the
message—delivered implicitly and explicitly—was this: one need not engage in regular
activism in the future, but simply vote in the fall midterms for the Republican candidates
who attended the rally. A group fronting for Republican interests could not have offered a
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more consistent message” (92). Furthermore, DiMaggio points to the strong connections
between  the  tea  party  and  various  individuals  and  institutions  associated  with  the
Republican Party either as party politicians, advisors, strategists or consulting agencies:
Dick Armey, Matt Kibbe, Mark Meckler, the Koch brothers, and the consulting firm Russo,
Marsh, and Rodgers. Thus, DiMaggio concludes that the tea party hardly comes from the
grassroots. Rather, it is merely the Republican faithful, masquerading as an “outside” and
“independent” political force. 
10 Taken one step further, we can see how the above points shaped the central theme of
DiMaggio’s book: the tea party is not a social movement. It is a construction—an illusion
perpetuated (mostly) by the conservative media and the Republican Party. Furthermore,
individuals  who  claim to  identify  with  the  tea  party,  DiMaggio  shows,  are  not  only
ignorant  of  social  movements  and  what  they  require,  but  their  individualistic  and
libertarian philosophical orientations make them inherently hostile against the concept
of collective action. The second chapter of the book, “The Tea Party Does Not Exist,”
succeeds in delivering this message, and it is repeated throughout the text. “The Tea
Party is lacking in all of the requirements for a social movement. For a movement to
undertake sustained collective action,  it  must  include regular meetings throughout a
large number of  localities.  Wide levels  of  participation must  be  maintained,  with an
empowerment of local members, rather than top-down dominance of organizing by elitist
actors. The Tea Party is fundamentally lacking in such participatory aspects” (46). Thus,
the tea party is not a grassroots social movement, but an “Astroturf” construction of the
media and Republican Party. 
11 The  question  remains,  however,  as  to  the  timing  and  purpose  of  the  creation  and
propagation of the tea party by the conservative establishment. In short, why would the
conservative establishment create, foster and sustain the appearance of the tea party?
DiMaggio’s answer is compelling, although it tends to get lost under the weight of his
emphasis on the movement’s “nonexistence.” DiMaggio argues that the tea party was
created in an effort to “rebrand” the Republican Party as being aligned with the interests
and concerns of middle class (white) Americans. “Republican officials probably have little
interest in what makes a genuine social movement…Rather they saw a growing general
public anger…and tried to take advantage of it in their attempts to win office in 2010 and
beyond…The [George W.] Bush administration was intimately associated with the failed
deregulatory politics that caused the economic crisis, and that link between Republican
politics and economic decline remained in the public mind for years. To overcome this
major hurdle, Republicans and Tea Partiers sought to repackage their party as the ‘party
of the people,’ specifically through the rise of the Tea Party phenomenon” (101).
12 This is DiMaggio’s strongest contribution in terms of his analysis of the tea party, and one
wishes that it would have been more forcefully made, instead of his repeated emphasis on
its “nonexistence” as an authentic social movement. Through his dismissal of the tea
party as essentially “not real,” one is left with the impression—despite his use of objective
language and statistical  models and “findings”—that DiMaggio falls  short of  taking it
seriously. Instead, we are left with a book that is too concerned with validating Herman
and  Chomsky’s  “propaganda  model”  and  less  concerned  with  understanding  the
individuals who identify with the movement and why they do so.  DiMaggio’s book is
devoid of interviews with tea partiers themselves, and instead looks from above, resting
upon survey results  and other  forms of  quantified data  such as  the compositions  of
nightly news broadcasts and newspaper articles—it is, after all, a work of “media studies”
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rather  than  a  book  about  people  participating  in  a  social  movement.  Of  course,  for
DiMaggio, this is precisely the point: the tea party is not a social movement; it can only be
understood by looking at the political elites and media establishment. 
13 At the other end of the methodological and stylistic spectrum stand Theda Skocpol and
Vanessa Williamson, whose The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism could
hardly  be  more different  than DiMaggio’s  book—despite  some overlap between their
analyses and conclusions.11 In a methodological sense, Skocpol and Williamson are not
out to validate models or to present “findings.” Despite an occasional table or reference
to a national survey, theirs is a qualitative rather than quantitative analysis. Their book is
full of interviews with tea party members, and it relies upon a somewhat ethnographic
account of the movement and its participants. In terms of style, Skocpol and Williamson
write with a strained informality. It is as though their time observing the tea partiers—
well known for their distrust of the academic establishment—has left them with either an
inability or distaste to write in mainstream academic prose. This is not necessarily a bad
thing,  and the book is  a  refreshing and much more enjoyable read than DiMaggio’s.
However, there is a sense in which Skocpol and Williamson (both of Harvard) are trying
too hard to mimic the anti-intellectualism of  the movement about which they write.
“Democrats have no hope of attracting Tea Party support, no matter how hard they tack
toward the right—especially not while Barack Obama, virtually the Devil incarnate for
Tea Partiers, remains in the White House. When Tea Partiers are faced at the polls with a
choice of Republican versus Democrat, the latter can ‘fuhgettabouddit’.”12 Elsewhere, “In
this book, for good reason, we have designated the conservative media complex as one of
the three main interacting forces that make up the Tea Party and give it oomph” (123).
Such is the stylistic quality of two researchers who believed that they escaped from the
ivory—rather, ivy tower, and blended into to the rank and file.
14 Aside from issues of style, Skocpol and Williamson treat the tea party as a chaotic social
movement that contains competing factions—in one memorable phrase, the tea party is
characterized as “a disunited field of  jostling organizations” (130).  They point to the
persistent tension, for example, that exists between the social and economic conservative
factions.  They recount  a  tea  party  member  who complained about  the  anti-abortion
pamphlets being distributed at a local meeting. He was subsequently left with a sense that
the movement had become “too churchy” (39). In another instance, a tea party member
distinguished between her attendance at the “Christian Tea Party” and the “regular Tea
Party,”  although  Skocpol  and  Williamson  maintain  that  “differences  between  social
conservatives  and  libertarians  do  not  lead  to  organizational  breakdowns,  however,
because members show sensitivity to one another’s beliefs and leaders find a way to blend
concerns” (37). They go on to show how social conservatives readily translated their ways
of practicing Christianity into a fundamentalist method of interpreting American history
(particularly through a “fundamentalist”  interpretation of  the Constitution)  and in a
more general conservative prosthelytizing effort (48-52).   
15 In  further  contrast  with  DiMaggio,  Skocpol  and Williamson survey  the  “panoply”  of
grassroots  and  national  tea  party  organizations  and show their  varied  and  nuanced
relationship  to  one  another,  and  more  importantly,  to  their  changing  dynamics  in
relation to the political, economic and media elites of the conservative establishment.
Unlike  DiMaggio,  who  sees  the  grassroots  as  an  offshoot  of  top-down  orchestrating
(indeed,  he rejects the notion that the tea party is  at  all  a  grassroots phenomenon),
Skocpol and Williamson show how the ties between the various local tea party groups and
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the national conservative establishment was a mutually beneficial relationship, both in
terms  of  funding  and  promotion.  “Fox  News  soon  recognized  a  major  conservative
phenomenon in the making and moved to become cheerleader in chief…The Tea Party
idea  was  presented  as  the  ‘coming  thing’  to  an  audience  primed  for  the  message.
Conservative Fox viewers across America heard that people like them were ready to stand
up to Obama and the Democrats—and they were told when and where” (130). They argue
it  was only after the 2010 midterm elections,  which saw huge gains for conservative
Republicans in Congress, that the political elites moved to the foreground of the tea party
movement. “The Tea Party…originally captivated the mainstream because it was seen as a
mighty  grassroots  force.  But  the  needs  of  the  media  outlets  themselves  increasingly
privilege the parts of the Tea Party panoply that are anything but truly grass roots. With
national  spokespersons  such as  elected office  holders  and paid  professionals  gaining
clout, grassroots Tea Partiers tend to lose visibility…Media outlets can run a bit of footage
showing people in costumes with signs—and then proceed to feature the likes of Michelle
Bachmann and Jim DeMint from Congress, or Dick Armey from FreedomWorks, or Mark
Meckler and Jenny Beth Martin from Tea Party Patriots. The mass movement portrayed
in 2010 can simply be reassigned to the role of backdrop for pronouncements from such
elite soothsayers” (152).
16  Skocpol and Williamson follow their careful examination of the forces that comprise the
tea  party  with  further  analyses  of  its  relationship  to  the  Republican  Party.  Unlike
DiMaggio,  who  characterizes  the  movement  as  a  party  appendage,  Skocpol  and
Williamson argue that the tea party can “cut both ways” for the Republicans. On one
hand, the tea party can serve as a public grassroots organizing and motivating force for
Republican and independent voters in national, state and local elections. But on the other
hand, Skocpol and Williamson maintain that the tea party also carries inherent risks: not
only  are  Republican-oriented  business  interests  weary  of  shortsighted  and
“uncompromising stances in budget battles” whose recklessness could potentially wreak
havoc  on  the  American  economy,  the  tea  party  could  also  alienate  political  and
ideological moderates who might otherwise be inclined to vote Republican if not for the
apparent interchangeability of the party with conservative extremists (186). These risks
for the party, when coupled with the authors’ observations of the movement, would seem
to have been borne out by the results of the 2012 presidential election and its aftermath.
They report “very scattered” support for particular conservative presidential candidates,
and that they “heard universal skepticism or negativity about Mitt Romney (because of
his  health  plan,  the  precursor  to  ObamaCare,  and  because  he  is  not  considered
trustworthy)” (194). Furthermore, political analysts are increasingly pointing to a “crisis”
of  viability  faced by  the  Republican Party  in  terms of  its  leadership  and ideological
direction  concerning  a  number  of  pressing  issues,  including  the  budgets  and  taxes,
immigration  policy  and  guns,  in  which  conservative  extremists  are  out-of-step  with
mainstream American opinion. 
17  Like DiMaggio,  Skocpol  and Williamson acknowledge (but similarly underemphasize)
that the tea party, whatever else it might be, was an opportunity for the Republican Party
to “rebrand” itself as a party of the people and to ensure the grassroots anger of ordinary
Americans stays  aimed at  Obama,  the Democrats,  and “government” more generally,
rather than at  the corporations and the bipartisan free market ideas that led to the
current global financial crisis.  It is indeed deeply ironic that the tea party frequently
points to an impromptu speech made by the CNBC reporter Rick Santelli as its founding
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moment.  Santelli,  of  course,  admonished  the  federal  government  in  his  diatribe  for
“rewarding the bad behavior”—not of the banks and financial institutions who either
made (Goldman Sachs) or lost (AIG, Lehman Brothers) billions of dollars through credit
default  swaps and other  instruments  of  deregulated finance gone amuck—but  of  the
greedy first time homeowners, a disproportionate number of whom, we now know, were
black and Latino—the ultimate “losers” of America’s Great Recession.13 Indeed, only in the
United States could a populist movement have been ignited by a speech made on the floor
of  a  global  mercantile  exchange.  No  doubt  such  a  turn  of  events  will  ensure  the
continuation of the Great American Conflict brought to mind by Thomas Frank—workers
versus government—despite the existence, or figment, of the tea party movement.
NOTES
1.  C.  Wright  Mills,  “The Conservative  Mood,”  in  Power,  Politics  and  People (Oxford University
Press, 1967) 210-1.
2.  Nash, George, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945 (ISI Books, 2006), 198.
3.  Mills wrote in a 1960 letter to his imaginary Russian pen pal Tovarich, “I have never been
interested in what is called ‘the Negro problem.’ Perhaps I should have been and should be now.
The truth is I’ve never looked into it as a researcher. I have a feeling that if I did it would turn out
to be ‘a white problem’ and I’ve got enough of those on my hands just now. But that isn’t quite
good enough is  it?  The only answer–I  didn’t  say practical  program, feasible plan,  etc.,  I  said
answer–is so obvious that it has no intellectual interest, and so in the long term, as matters now
stand, it has no political interest. The answer, of course, is full and complete marriage between
members  of  all  races.”  Kathryn  Mills  &  Pamela  Mills  [eds.]  C.  Wright  Mills  Letters  and
Autobiographical Writings (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 314.
4.  Thomas Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won the Heart of America (New
York: Holt, 2004), 148.
5.  Quotations  in  this  paragraph  are  from  the  KPBS  video,  “Proposition  13.”  See  http://
video.kpbs.org/video/1695956926/.
6.  Daniel  A.  Smith,  “Howard  Jarvis,  Populist  Entrepreneur:  Reevaluating  the  Causes  of
Proposition 13,” Social Science History 23 (1999): 178, 203. 
7.  7 Portions of this and the previous paragraph are taken from my forthcoming book, The 1980
Presidential Election: Ronald Reagan and the Shaping of the American Conservative Movement
(Routledge, 2013).
8.  Anthony DiMaggio, The Rise of the Tea Party: Political Discontent and Corporate Media in the
Age of Obama (Monthly Review Press, 2011).
9.  Edward Herman & Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass
Media (Pantheon, 1988). 
10.  DiMaggio, Tea Party, 193.
11.  Theda  Skocpol  and  Vanessa Williamson,  The  Tea  Party  and  the  Remaking  of  Republican
Conservatism (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
12.  Skocpol and Williamson, The Tea Party, 28. The slang term ‘fuhgettabouddit’ (working class
Italian-American speak for ‘forget about it’) was popularized by Johnnie Depp’s title character in
Anthony DiMaggio, The Rise of the Tea Party: Political Discontent and Corpora...
European journal of American studies , Reviews 2013-1 | 2013
8
the 1997 film, Donnie Brasco, after which time the phrase briefly became part of American pop
culture.
13.  For data on the racialized effects of the Great Recession, see the Pew report, “Wealth Gaps





Assistant Professor of Sociology at Yeditepe University in Istanbul, and author of The 1980
Presidential Election: Ronald Reagan and the Shaping of the American Conservative Movement
(Routledge, 2013).
Anthony DiMaggio, The Rise of the Tea Party: Political Discontent and Corpora...
European journal of American studies , Reviews 2013-1 | 2013
9
